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China’s relations with the developing world: a new type of colonialism or a 
fruitful cooperation 
 
“In order to maintain peace and stability and to 
promote prosperity and development in the region 
friendly relationships and pragmatic cooperation with 
neighbouring countries will be deepened, as well as 
unity and cooperation with developing countries will be 
enhanced and traditional friendship and common 
interests will be maintained.” 
 
12
th
 Five-Year Plan, Chapter 53 
 
1. Introduction 
The Peoples Republic of China (PRC) decided to strengthen its relationship with the 
developing world already in the 50s and 60s, in parallel with the rupture between the country 
and the USSR. Although the Chinese leadership didn’t have the necessary sources and 
influence in the beginning, this policy was reconfirmed in the 70s, got a new meaning after 
the collapse of the bipolar world and enjoys an increasing success since the new millennium.  
Despite the fact that this strategy is well suited both to the ‘harmonious world’ 
concept and to China’s vision of the multipolar world, and it is also an effective ground for 
China's soft power, some refers to China's presence in the developing world as a new type of 
colonialism (for example, Bergesen, 2008; Sharife 2009; Jauch, 2011). They argue that 
China’s appearance doesn’t bring new opportunities to the countries of the Third World, in 
fact they get another oppressive power ruthlessly exploiting their resources. Undoubtedly, 
China’s increased influence in these regions hurts interests, primarily the interests of other – 
mostly Western – powers, whose influence is overshadowed by China in the countries of the 
developing world.  
Although the developing regions and countries differ in many ways from each other, 
there are several common features in their relationship with China. These countries and 
regions were mostly under the supremacy – or in the economic sphere – of other (mainly 
Western) powers due to their colonial past or other historical reasons. This historic 
dependence prevailed in the modern era as well and resulted in a hierarchical relationship, 
where the developed state still wants to dictate and intends to enforce its own rules and 
system to the developing state. Today, the Chinese expansion questions the leadership of the 
United States and Europe in Latin America, Africa, East Asia, and the leading role of Russia 
in Central Asia.  
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The following sub-chapters are organized as follows: Sub-chapter 2 gives an overview 
of the relationships between China and some regions of the developing world, analysing 
Beijing's foreign policy towards the ASEAN-region, Central Asia, Africa and Latin America. 
Sub-chapter 3 focuses on the main (economic) pillars of the relations with the above 
mentioned regions, especially on the Chinese side. Trade and investment relations (sub-
chapter 3.1) are strengthening, the developing world has a growing share of Chinese 
merchandise export as well as Chinese outward foreign direct investment in recent years, 
while these countries are also becoming the cure for China’s hunger for energy (sub-chapter 
3.2). Sub-chapter 4 provides some conclusions. 
 
2. Overview of the relations   
During the period of China’s reform and opening up, when the country started to settle 
its diplomatic relations with the great powers, Beijing's foreign policy has become 
increasingly pragmatic towards the developing countries too. However, while in the 70s and 
80s the Asia-Pacific region - although somewhat pushed into the background – remained 
relatively important partner to China, the countries of Africa and Latin America did not play a 
central role in Beijing's diplomacy at that time. Shortly after the end of the Cold War and the 
transformation of the international system, the cooperation between China and the developing 
countries gained a momentum for two reasons: 
1. On the one hand, China's economic and political interest has increased 
significantly towards these areas, several new efforts were made to build a 
comprehensive partnership with the old Asian friends and the new African and 
Latin American partners.  
2. On the other hand, for many developing countries - especially for those that 
had troubled relations with the United States or Europe or drifted to the edge 
of the international system – the rise of China became a promising opportunity 
for catching up, while the possibility that China might contribute to a 
multipolar world, from which they could benefit as well, also resulted in 
positive expectations (Ding, 2008, p. 198). 
Analysing China’s relations to the developing regions, its relation to Asia, especially 
to the Asia-Pacific region, seems to be the most ancient and utmost important relationship, as 
the consequences of China's growth or the effects of its rise of power had their strongest 
influence here first. In addition to that, the way China is managing its own growth and wield 
its power in the region is an important indicator of how it will act as a global power in the 
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future (Martin, 2009, p. 273). Throughout its history, China used to be the dominant and 
leading power of its own neighbourhood. The size of its territory and population alone made 
it the most important factor in this region. Nowadays, the Asia-Pacific region is reshaped by 
the growth of China, the region’s agenda is determined directly or indirectly by Beijing, 
which affects the countries of this region as a kind of gravitational field. These countries – 
although there are still tensions between them – have no intention to seriously deteriorate 
their relationship with the PRC. 
Despite of the above mentioned historical roots China does not have an easy ride here 
as this region is the home of more than one-third of the world's total population, where China 
is facing with two challenges, the Japanese economic power and the military of the US, and 
also bounded by two other potential regional power, Russia and India. China’s rise as a 
regional power is thus hampered by several challenges, of which the border disputes causes 
most of the tensions between China and its mentioned neighbours. Major territorial and 
border disputes related to the following areas in the Asia-Pacific region: Taiwan, Paracel 
Islands, Spratly Islands, Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands, the Socotra (Suyan) Rock, and a part of 
the Sino-Indian border. Although the most problematic disputes are still to be settled, in 
parallel with its regional power ambitions, China managed to find a solution to many of its 
border disputes, primarily with Russia and Central Asian countries and as far as its strategic 
interests allows, it will continue to work to address these issues.  
China seeks to develop good-neighbourly relations, so it is using the methods of 
confidence-building, economic integration and multilateral cooperation to maintain mutual 
interests and regional stability and to reduce security tensions (Bergsten et al., 2009, pp. 220-
221). Cooperation in the field of infrastructural projects is one of the popular tools of China’s 
for building regional identity and solidarity. This kind of cooperation is realized in many 
countries in recent years from North and Southeast Asia to Central and South Asia. China’s 
involvement in regional organizations is an even more significant method: the ASEAN+3 
initiative (ASEAN countries with South Korea, Japan and China), the ASEAN+6 initiative (in 
addition to the foregoing, Australia, India and New Zealand), and the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation (Russia and Central Asian countries) all demonstrate China's regional 
cooperation efforts. However, the intensity of economic relations outweighs the importance of 
political, regional and development cooperation since interdependences between China and 
the region is getting stronger due to the significant increase in intra-regional trade: for 
example, trade between ASEAN and China grow more than 20 percent per year since 2002 
(Tran, 2010, p. 89). 
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As some of the countries of the region – in contrast to African and Latin American 
countries – are often fear of the growth of China's regional influence, Beijing uses the method 
of ‘smile diplomacy’ to defuse these concerns (Ding, 2008, p. 203). This strategy includes the 
tools of soft power, through which the countries of the region can be convinced of China's 
peaceful intentions, emphasizing that the country does not seek hegemony in the region, but 
wants to build good neighbourly relations with them. To this end, Beijing has pointed out 
many times that it aims to bring prosperity and security to the region, therefore mutual 
confidence and cooperation need to be strengthened, while existing tensions have to be solved. 
As a part of this strategy, China gave economic assistance to the countries most affected by 
the 1997 Asian financial crisis, took an active part in resolving the 2002 North Korean nuclear 
crisis and it also attempts to reduce its military presence in the case of border disputes or at 
least use it for a short time, for demonstrative purposes only. China’s increasingly active role 
and efforts for the benefit of the region in the intra-regional and multilateral organizations are 
also part of this process, just like the improvement in China-Taiwan relations in recent years. 
Although border disputes create tensions from time to time, the above mentioned 
method seems to be successful as the countries of the region have a more positive attitude 
towards China in recent years, the China-threat is fading, while China is increasingly 
considered as a source of opportunities for several countries in the region. For example, Deng 
cites a South Korean public opinion research from 2005, in which the majority of respondents 
are of the opinion that the United States and Japan are much more dangerous for the country 
than China, the Korean foreign policy should therefore turn more towards the PRC (Deng, 
2008, p. 205). Beijing's influence in the region is of growing importance, more and more East 
Asian diplomats seek the opinions of the Chinese diplomats in various international forums 
(Cody, 2005), and these countries are increasingly taking into account China's interests when 
taking decisions.  
However, despite of the Sino-Indian Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace 
and Prosperity established in 2005, their relationship is troubled with issues like historical 
grievances, border disputes, India’s continuing sanctuary to the Dalai Lama as well as 
conflicting views on great power intentions or perceptions on South Asia. Moreover, the 
China-Pakistan relation hampers this partnership even more as the links between Beijing and 
Islamabad are quite strong since the 60s, moreover, China's interests in Central Asia and in 
the Middle East could motivate even stronger relationship. Today, China is Pakistan’s largest 
supplier of arms and they are also cooperating in Pakistan’s nuclear power sector. Beijing 
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supports Islamabad’s position on Kashmir, while Pakistan supports China on the issues of 
Xinjiang, Tibet and Taiwan (Steinbock, 2013).  
In the 90s Central Asia seemed to be the subject to an increased competition between 
the United States and Russia, but today it is more likely that China's influence is further 
strengthened, marginalizing the role of other powers. Beijing aims to attach this region to its 
own Asia-Pacific sphere of influence: it tries to control the arms and drug trade within the 
area bounded by Xinjiang, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Afghanistan to avoid destabilization, 
furthermore, it tries to influence this area both economically and culturally. China's presence 
in Central Asia has become quite widespread, settles in all possible sectors, filling the vacuum 
left behind by the former Soviet Union. Central Asia is not only an important border area in 
terms of stability but a significant transit region to Iran, Afghanistan, to Pakistan and India, 
while it may partly cover China's growing energy demand as there are significant sources of 
oil as well as natural gas.  
The China-Africa relationship – as Beijing is regularly stressing – is also rooted in the 
past, but compared to Asian relations it is rather a new one. Already in the 50s and 60s, China 
identified itself with the less developed countries of the continent to promote Chinese-style 
communism against Soviet and U.S. ideologies. For example, in southern Africa a number of 
liberation movements were supported diplomatically and even militarily by China, if these 
movements have highlighted the values of Maoism  (Alden, 2010, pp. 29-33). Beijing sought 
broad alliances with countries in the region, for which it used large-scale projects and aids 
(Vári, 2009, p. 225). However, at that time, economic and political relations were not the 
main driving force of these steps, since China built these partnerships for diplomatic reasons, 
mainly for the issue of Taiwan’s ‘non-recognition’. Diplomatic cooperation was not followed 
by major economic and political agreements (Kiss-Tétényi, 2009, p. 267) in the first decades. 
After the Chinese Cultural Revolution, the Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
has become a cornerstone of the relationship, which was mostly used for infrastructure 
development. Within this framework, China gave a total of 4.9 billion USD assistance to 
African countries between 1957 and 1989. In most of these cases, the involvement of Chinese 
companies and suppliers was one of the conditions but a smaller part of this assistance 
reached the continent through international channels, such as World Health Organization or 
other UN organizations (Alden, 2010, pp. 34-35). From the 80s China placed more emphasis 
on the profitable forms of economic cooperation with Africa. Several Chinese companies got 
a foothold in the continent to participate in construction projects financed by Chinese money. 
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In addition to the involvement of Chinese companies, Chinese commodities were also 
necessary to use.  
Although many people still blame China for the above mentioned steps, it should not 
be forgotten that China’s support to Africa has never been motivated by goodwill but profit, 
however, China always tried to ensure the benefit of both sides, yet to varying degrees. And 
the Chinese support was helpful to the countries of the continent indeed, as these 
developments could not be carried out otherwise. Additional important result of the Chinese 
assistance was that it made the African political and business elite the friends of China
1
. 
These countries – as they typically vote in blocks in international organizations – can be 
expected in all cases when China, the Chinese foreign policy, or the issues of human rights is 
criticized (Alden, 2010, p. 34.). 
 After the end of the cold war Africa lost its former strategic attractiveness to the main 
powers, therefore foreign assistance became more important to the continent. Hence, China 
could launch its ‘diplomatic offensive’ to Africa without having challengers at all: the U.S. 
and Russia turned away from the region, which was coupled with the indifference of the 
European countries. In this position, the tools of public diplomacy, such as cultural diplomacy, 
complemented China’s economic instruments 2 . Today, although the value of China's 
multilateral assistance is increasing, the major part of it is still provided bilaterally. Nearly 
half of China's assistance directed towards Asia, but about a third of it arrives at Africa, and 
only ten percent goes to Latin America (Vári, 2009, p. 230). However, it is also true that more 
assistance is given to friendly countries than for those, who have any kind of dispute with 
China
3
. 
 Undoubtedly, raw materials and energy resources are Africa’s main attraction for 
China but Beijing strengthens its ties with the region because it is looking for reliable allies 
too. To this end, China helps, where others are not willing to help. For example, at the end of 
the 90s, when Ethiopia attacked Eritrea, the United States reduced its diplomatic presence in 
the country, while China sent new diplomats, engineers and teachers. It also helped Angola 
with loans and technical assistance in the economic reconstruction after the civil war, and also 
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 One of the consequences of this new friendship was that Africa didn’t support the international reaction to the 
Tienanmen Square intervention in 1989. 
2
 The China Radio International and several Confucius Institutes appeared in the region; many cultural 
agreements were concluded; African students get a lot of scholarship opportunities from the Chinese 
Government yearly; and Chinese tourism has flourished significantly as well. 
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 For example, the Chinese government so far has pledged only 1.6 million USD to the Philippines in the wake 
of the devastating Typhoon Haiyan, 2013. In comparison, the U.S. aid sum is more than $37 million, and the 
Chinese amount is still less than the 2.7 million USD offered by Swedish furniture company IKEA. One reason 
for that might be that China has an ongoing dispute with the Philippines over the South China Sea. 
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provided assistance to Nigeria several times. Today, these countries are the major African 
partners of China. 
 China intends to treat the African countries as equal partners, suggesting that they are 
all developing countries. In contrast to the Western powers, China doesn’t have political 
requirements, but it respects and supports African countries' independence, sovereignty, 
political systems and traditions. This strategy – as Ding points out – makes China sympathetic 
not only for African leaders but for African people as well, who truly believe that Chinese 
businessmen don’t want to exploit Africa, but want to create mutual benefit (Ding, 2008, pp. 
200-201). Almost all African countries stand up for China in international forums, there are 
only four underdeveloped countries
4
 that maintains diplomatic relations with Taiwan, while 
the rest of the continent recognizes the PRC. 
While the Asia Pacific and Central Asian region were bound to China because of 
geographical proximity and historical roots from the beginning, and China-Africa relations 
also started to deepen in the 50s-60s, Latin America appeared later on China’s horizon: 
Chinese diplomatic support was rather rhetorical in the 60s and 70s. The relationship’s revival 
took place in the mid 90s, in parallel with a significant increase in Chinese export to the 
continent. For China, this region is an important source of raw material, energy and food, 
while Latin American markets are also reliable demanders of cheap Chinese products 
(Lehoczki, 2008, p. 178). Additionally, the region also has several votes in international 
forums. 
The fact that half of the countries recognizing Taiwan in the world are in this region 
(mainly in Central America and the Caribbean) also makes this continent important for China. 
Taiwan maintains close contacts with the region and tries to maintain the loyalty of these 
countries through economic assistance. However, Taiwan's ‘dollar diplomacy’ met a strong 
challenger in the last decade: for example, Grenada recognized the PRC instead of Taiwan 
after it received nearly 5 billion USD Chinese assistance after the devastation of the hurricane 
in 2004 (Sutter, 2010, p. 332). Several countries – which recognize Taiwan for the time being 
– signed tourism cooperation with Beijing in recent years. 
Soft-power tools are often used in the case of Latin American countries too, as 
Chinese political values and economic model of development is ever more attractive to the 
countries of the region: the region went through major political and economic transformation 
in recent times, as a result, left or centre-left governments have come to power in several 
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 Swaziland, Gambia, Burkina Faso, and Sao Tome and Principe. 
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countries
5
, anti-free market and anti-U.S. movements are became stronger, while in terms of 
economic development, China’s unique development path is becoming sympathetic for them 
(Ding, 2008, p. 207).  
Since the early 2000s – in 2001, Jiang Zemin visited several countries of the region – 
the number of diplomatic visits increased significantly between China and the countries of the 
region, the diplomatic delegations were supplemented by businessmen delegations quite 
frequently. In the middle of 2000s, Hu Jintao also visited its partners in the region, as a result 
China received market economy status from Argentina and Brazil. In addition to these two 
countries, China entered into strategic alliance with Mexico, Venezuela and Chile, while it 
still has close and friendly relations with Cuba, and sent four peacekeeping team to Haiti for 
example, where it assisted the elections as well. 
The motto of China's presence in Latin America is basically the same as in the case of 
Asia or Africa: economic cooperation without political interference in domestic affairs. 
According to Chinese and Latin American point of view, this is exactly the opposite of what 
they received from western countries in the past as economic cooperation has always been a 
tool of political influence. In this relationship, Beijing also stresses the importance of win-win 
cooperation, which should be useful and beneficial to both sides. For the Latin American 
countries – especially for those that are isolated and don’t have friendly relations with the U.S. 
or the EU – China means access to one of the fastest growing markets as well as to the 
necessary investments, without political expectations. In return, China obtains energy 
resources, raw materials, agricultural products, and other factors, which it needs for further 
economic development. In addition, it also wins new allies to contain Taiwan’s independence 
aspirations and strengthen its international position. 
 
3. Main pillars of the relation 
China often characterizes itself as a responsible developing country, whose main 
purpose is to embrace the developing world through aid, cultural relations, the increasing 
level of investments and the expansion of trade. In the last decades, especially since the turn 
of the millennium, the country acts accordingly, building intensifying political as well as trade 
and investment relations with the countries of the developing world, however, not only with 
the intention of good will but in accordance with its own interests and growing needs for 
energy and raw materials.  
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 Such as in Bolivia, Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Chile. 
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This expansion generates many debates internationally, mostly about the nature of 
China's intentions. Much of these debates focus on the China-Africa relations with the subject 
that China – like a traditional colonial power – is exploiting Africa's natural treasures. Most of 
these critics are coming from the Western World since through the strengthening of China's 
influence Western interests are violated. China stresses that its relation to the developing 
countries based simply on each other's comparative advantages since China has the essential 
capital and technology to the development of Africa or Latin-America, while the countries of 
these regions are able to provide raw materials and energy resources necessary for China. 
The next sub-chapters aim to examine the main dimensions of the relationship 
between China and the developing world, analysing the expansion and features of trade 
relations, the development and characteristics of investment and China’s demand for energy. 
 
3.1. Trade and investment relations  
Following the introduction of the reform and opening up policy, foreign trade became 
a decisive factor in China’s development. As part of this process, the PRC established trade 
relations with almost every country in the world, which it developed continuously: it 
strengthened its existing relationships through the deepening of trade relations with the 
developed world and its Asian partners, while the developing countries of Africa and Latin-
America had also been emerged as important partners. After the turn of the millennium the 
developing world began to play an increasingly important role in China's trade and capital 
export. According to Chinese statistics, in China's total trade in goods from 2005 to 2010  
- the proportion of trade with ASEAN increased from 9.2 percent to 9.8 percent,  
- with other BRIC countries from 4.9 percent to 6.9 percent,  
- with Latin America from 3.5 percent to 6.2 percent,  
- and with Africa from 2.8 percent to 4.3 percent6.  
Successful trade relations were followed by an increasing amount of Chinese 
investment, through which both China is able to obtain raw materials and energy resources 
and the developing countries are getting access to resources for development. In many cases 
the extent and nature of these resources has provided the opportunity to such development, for 
which the developing – mainly African – countries waited in vain for decades from the West. 
In general, Asia has always been China's most important export market, although its 
share started to decrease at the end of the nineties, mainly after the China’s accession to the 
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 The data are derived from Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) of the People's Republic of China, based on the 
summary of China Daily: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2011-12/08/content_14232230.htm  
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World Trade Organization: according to MOFCOM data, it reached its peak – 62 percent of 
China’s total export – in 1995 and decreased to 53 percent in 2001. Chinese import is also a 
good example for the Asia-focused nature of Chinese trade: in 2001, 60 percent of China's 
imports originated from Asia (Fung et al., 2002). This was certainly due to the increasing role 
of the (East) Asian production networks and China’s involvement within that.7  
However, as Asia is the largest and most populated continent, which includes areas 
with different level of economic development as well as different structure of trade, it is hard 
to analyse China’s relation to this developing region as a whole. Therefore, within China’s 
relationship with Asia, the sub-chapter deals with China’s relation to the two major 
organizations (and its member states) within this region, the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) with a brief outlook on 
Sino-Indian relations. 
Economic relations between China and ASEAN member states started to increase 
rapidly from the 90s, before that China didn’t even have formal relationship with the 
association, only with its individual member states on a bilateral basis. Völgyi divides the 
development of the China-ASEAN relationship into three phases: a comprehensive dialogue 
was evolved between 1991 and 1996, partnership based on mutual trust built up between 1997 
and 2002, while from 2003 onwards, there relationship has been qualified as strategic 
partnership (Völgyi, 2011, p. 80). Based on ASEANstats8, the bilateral trade between China 
and ASEAN increased by 20.4 percent annually between 1991 and 2000, reaching 39,5 
billion USD by the turn of the millennium. According to Völgyi, bilateral merchandised trade 
between China and ASEAN member states increased nearly thirty times in the last two 
decades (Völgyi, 2011, p. 83).  
As shown in Figure 1., there was a slight decrease in 2009 as a result of the economic 
and financial crisis, which was far exceeded by 2010. According to Chinese statistics, the 
volume of the China-ASEAN bilateral trade was 362,3 billion USD in 2011, that is to say, 
China has maintained its previous position as the largest trading partner of ASEAN, while 
ASEAN became China's third largest trading relation, ahead of Japan. Moreover, most 
estimates say that by 2015 it is likely that they surpass 500 billion USD.  
Among the countries of ASEAN, Singapore and Malaysia are the two major trading 
partner of China, representing nearly half of the trade between China and ASEAN. 
                                                 
7
 According to this theory, China more intensively relies on processing inputs from East Asia than from 
countries outside of East Asia.  
8
 Official statistical database of the ASEAN: http://www.aseansec.org/22122.htm 
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Figure 1. 
 
 Source: China Statistical Database and MOFCOM 
 
Regarding the structure of trade, the main products of ASEAN’s export to China are 
electrical machinery, mechanical equipment and parts, nuclear reactors and boilers, mineral 
fuels and oil products, rubber and articles thereof, animal or vegetable fats and oils, plastics 
and chemicals. The structure of ASEAN‘s import from China is quite similar to the structure 
of its export with the only exception that in this case the trade of iron as well as steel and 
products thereof is more significant (Völgyi, 2011, p. 84). 
China’s investment in ASEAN-countries shows a different pattern compared to 
African and Latin-American relations as the latter regions typically do not appear in China as 
an investor only as a recipient of Chinese capital, while in the case of China-ASEAN relations 
both sides are significant investor in each other’s regions, furthermore, ASEAN-investments 
in China exceeds the amount of Chinese capital in ASEAN countries.  
In 2010, ASEAN invested 6,32 billion USD in China, which is more than 35 percent 
increase over the previous year. According to official statistics of ASEAN, Chinese FDI 
decreased from 3,9 billion USD in 2009 to 2,7 billion USD in 2010 as a result of the crisis. 
However, this amount is still significant when compared to Chinese investment worth of only 
300 million USD in 2003. Based on Chinese Statistical Office data, Chinese FDI stock in 
ASEAN member states amounted to 12,5 billion USD by 2011, nearly half of that was 
realized in the previous two years. The main sectors of Chinese outward foreign direct 
investments are similar to other relations of China in the developing world: agriculture, 
manufacturing, mining, tourism, electricity and infrastructure. 
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The history of trade relations between China and Central Asia can be divided into 
three periods, too. The first period, 1992-1996, is characterized by the continuation of the 
former family, clan-level and regional trade networks. Trade volume during this period was 
between 350 and 700 million USD annually. The second period, 1997-2001, is characterized 
by a slow but noteworthy increase of approximately 25 percent. After the establishment of 
SCO in 1996, the appearance and success of the Chinese companies in the region was 
somewhat overshadowed by the economic crisis of the Central Asian states, the financial and 
economic crisis of Russia in 1998 and some border disputes. The new period started after the 
settlement of these border disputes. This third period is characterized by the joint and 
pragmatic thinking, the search for common economic benefits. As a result of this shift, trade 
relations flourished and Chinese companies have consolidated their position in the key sectors 
of Central Asia (Fehér-Szunomár, 2009, pp. 237-238).  
Since the millennium, the China-Central Asia relations are developing more intensely: 
trade volume increased by more than 200 percent between 2002 and 2003 already, from one 
billion USD per year to more than three billion; between 2004 and 2006 trade growth was 150 
percent, reaching a value of more than 10 billion USD (Peyrouse, 2007). According to 
Chinese statistics, Sino-Central Asian trade volume was almost 13 billion USD in 2006. 
Based on Sebastien Peyrouse’s estimates, trade volume of 2006 can be even higher, around 
18 billion USD as Chinese statistics needs to be supplemented, for example with the less 
monitored cross-border trade (Peyrouse, 2007). According to MOFCOM data, Sino-Central 
Asian trade volume reached 25,9 billion USD in 2009 and almost 30 billion in 2010. 
Although the trade with Central Asia is not significant in China’s total trade 
(approximately 1 percent), China is an important partner for the region as it is responsible for 
20 percent of Central Asian import, based on 2008 data. China’s export to the region grows 
faster than import, as a result there is a significant deficit in their trade relations, which ranged 
around 7 billion USD over the past years. This dynamic growth has primarily occurred in the 
case of China’s major trading partners in the region, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, but 
extended to other states as well after the millennium: there is a noteworthy increase in trade 
relations between China and Tajikistan since 2004, with Uzbekistan since 2005, and similar 
trends emerged in the case of Turkmenistan as well. 
As regards trade structure, nearly 85 percent of Chinese exports are finished products, 
while Central Asia’s export of raw materials, especially oil, ferrous and non-ferrous metals 
account for a similar proportion. In the case of Central Asia’s export, the lack of 
diversification is obvious: one quarter of the Kazakh exports to China is oil, another quarter is 
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non-ferrous metals, while iron, steel and other metals together also account for 25 percent of 
export; in the case of Kyrgyzstan, the export of metal accounts for one third of the exports. By 
contrast, China’s export to Central Asia is more diversified: among others, it includes 
consumer goods, machinery, electronics as well as processed food, textiles, footwear, 
pharmaceuticals and auto parts (Völgyi, 2011, p. 103 and Fehér-Szunomár, 2009, p. 238). 
Cross-border trade is still an important part of Sino-Central Asian trade, however it is 
often difficult to measure statistically. Barter trade is also common, mainly in the case of 
leather products and food. The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, established by 
Beijing, organize almost one-third of the trade between China and Central Asia, while private 
companies perform the rest of it. 
In addition to trade relations, through their investments Chinese public and private 
companies became responsible for the deployment of practically the whole infrastructure of 
Central Asian countries since these countries couldn’t afford to make these investments on 
their own because of the lack of capital, but the old infrastructure from Soviet times has 
become quite obsolete today. These Chinese public and private companies have the necessary 
experience and work at much lower rates than other international companies, moreover, 
Chinese state-owned banks offer favourable financial conditions and low interest rates for the 
Central Asian states. In return, Beijing is getting stronger positions in areas and sectors of 
strategic importance such as ferrous minerals, non-ferrous metals, hydro electronics, railways, 
roads, and telecommunications. However, the most significant part of the Chinese FDI targets 
the oil and gas sector of Central Asia, as described in the following chapter. 
As mentioned above, the relationship between China and India are strained, although 
their economic relations seems to be improving since 2003, when India formally accepted that 
Tibet is part of China, and China has acknowledged India's sovereignty over Sikkim. The 
bilateral trade volume grew from 13.6 billion USD in 2004 to 18.7 billion USD in 2005 
(Deng, 2008, p. 154), and reached 73.9 billion USD in 2011, based on Chinese data. The 
structure of Chinese export products are similar to its other relations, while Indian export is 
essentially consists of primary products and raw materials, of which iron-ore is the most 
significant. According to Chinese statistics, India’s trade deficit with China is widening from 
year to year, it is over 28 billion USD recently. To overcome this deficit, India is trying to 
strengthen its IT and pharmaceutical exports towards China. In parallel with the development 
of trade relations, Chinese investments also appeared in the country, mainly in the field of 
infrastructure and mining but in the IT-sector as well, through Huawei's investment. Indian 
capital is also present in China, for example, Tata Consultancy Services, one of the largest 
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software and IT services provider in the Asia-Pacific region, has tripled its Chinese 
investments during 2011. 
The Chinese-African economic relations have also evolved considerably in recent 
years. The rapid increase is a result of common efforts, where both China and the African 
countries can benefit from the cooperation. In the fifties, only three countries - Egypt, 
Morocco and Tunisia - have signed an intergovernmental trade agreement with China, this 
number rose to 13 in the sixties, it was 46 in 1987 an 50 in 1999. In 2006, when all of the 53 
African countries attended the third China-Africa Economic Cooperation Forum, China has 
become Africa's second largest trading partner after the United States, ahead of France. 
In the 50s, economic relations were defined mostly by bilateral trade and Chinese aid 
to the countries of the region but over time, the scope of cooperation is widened and their 
content is deepened as well. According to MOFCOM data, the trade volume of 12,14 million 
USD in 1950 increased to 166,45 million by 1990 and has risen at a higher rate thereafter, 
reaching 6,48 billion USD, which is 533-times bigger than it was fifty years earlier. As shown 
in Figure 2., this increase is even more significant after the turn of the millennium: from 10,6 
billion USD in 2000, Chinese-African trade volume reached 126,91 billion in 2010, which is 
a 28 percent average annual growth rate for the first ten years. In 2011, their trade volume 
was above 167 billion USD (MOFCOM, 2011).  
 
Figure 2. 
 
 Source: China Statistical Database and MOFCOM 
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The establishment of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000 
significantly contributed to achieve these results. After this year, economic and trade 
cooperation has gained a momentum, while in addition to trade relations also investment, 
infrastructure financial cooperation and tourism have started to develop. 
In parallel with the expansion of the trade, the product structure has also changed and 
optimized. Regarding the structure of Chinese export to Africa, it is quite similar to the 
structure of export to other regions or countries (mainly inter-industry trade), except for East 
Asia, where the share of intra-industry trade is growing. In the 80s and 90s, Chinese export 
basically consisted of light industry products, food and chemical products. Since the turn of 
the millennium, the export of good quality and technologically advanced products such as 
equipment, machinery products, cars and electronics products also increased significantly. 
Currently these products account for more than half of China's exports to Africa (MOFCOM, 
2011).  
Initially, Africa’s export to China was dominated by primarily products such as cotton 
and phosphate but the structure of export changed significantly in recent times. Not 
surprisingly, energy and raw materials are dominant: fossil fuel, lubricating oil and related 
raw materials account for more than sixty percent of African exports to China, while a 
significant percentage of the remaining part consist of various raw materials, non-edible 
materials and finished products (MOFCOM, 2011), which is similar to the export structure of 
African countries in case of other destinations too. In this regard, Liang points out that while 
many people blame China for the exploitation of African resources, the African industrial 
system should be blamed instead because it operates unilaterally and inefficiently as its 
comparative advantage is based overly on energy, raw materials and other natural resources. 
He notes that based on its share or the absolute amount, China still imports less of those 
products from Africa than the United States or the developed countries of Europe  (Liang, 
2011). 
Chinese import from Africa are no longer limited to the above mentioned energy 
sources and raw materials since steel, copper, fertilizers and electronics produced in Africa 
have also appeared in China recently, while the export of African agricultural products began 
to grow as well: local specialties such as Egyptian oranges, wine from South Africa, Ghana's 
cocoa beans, Ugandan coffee, olive oil from Tunisia and Ethiopian sesame are already known 
and popular among Chinese consumers. 
China's most important trading partners in Africa are South Africa, Angola, Sudan, 
Nigeria, Egypt, Algeria, the Republic of Congo, Liberia, the Democratic Republic of Congo 
16 
and Morocco. These ten countries together account for 70-80 percent of both total exports and 
imports. Most of them – especially the oil producer countries9 –have significant trade surplus 
with China, but some of them
10
 struggles with a significant deficit. 
Regarding Chinese investments in Africa, it started to be significant in the 80s and 
most of it were government-funded projects supporting mainly the expansion of Chinese 
presence in local markets. The already mentioned assistance projects took the form of joint 
ventures, cooperative joint venture or lease but in parallel with that it was also typical that 
those companies, which had long-term trade relationship with Africa established factories. 
However, due to the limited financial opportunities of Chinese companies these investments 
were mainly smaller projects: China invested 51,19 million USD, in 102 projects in Africa 
between 1979 and 1990, which is approximately half a million dollars per project (FOCAC, 
2010). 
After the 90s not only the African economy was on the rise but due to the change in 
Chinese government strategy, Chinese companies became stronger and braver as well, which 
boosted their investments in Africa significantly. By the last decade of the 20th century both 
the targets of investment and the range of investors have diversified. Chinese capital appeared 
in the African textile industry, in agro processing, in the field of production of mechanical 
equipment as well as in mining, manufacturing and service sector. Among investors there are 
both state-owned enterprises and private companies, regarding the form of investment, 
wholly-owned companies and joint ventures forms can be find too. 
After the establishment of FOCAC, the amount of Chinese investment increased 
further, the China-Africa Development Fund and several commercial and economic 
cooperation zones were established. By the end of 2009, the Development Fund has allocated 
700 million USD in over 30 projects in areas such as mining, agriculture, construction 
material production, and industrial parks. The cooperation zones in Zambia, Mauritius, 
Nigeria, Egypt and Ethiopia perform well with a number of infrastructural projects carried out 
here: the investments of Chinese companies operating in these areas was close to 950 million 
USD by the end of 2009 (FOCAC, 2010).  
More than eight hundred Chinese state-owned enterprises operate in Africa, but there 
are several small and medium-sized private companies as well. However, the so-called ’China 
shops’ – selling bargains everything from shoes and clothes to plastic toys – have much larger 
                                                 
9
 Angola, Sudan, Congo and the Republic of South Africa can be mentioned here, but Libya and Zambia are also 
one of the major surplus countries. 
10
 Nigeria, Egypt and Algeria have the most significant trade deficit towards China, but Liberia, Morocco, Benin, 
Ghana, Togo and Ethiopia have large deficits as well. 
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impact on the life of African people. These shops are quite popular and expanding at a rapid 
pace in the region. The increasing number of Chinese immigrants can be linked to this 
process, since the appearance of a Chinese company – whether large or small – in this area is 
often accompanied by the explosive growth of immigration (Alden, 2010, pp. 62-63). Among 
these Chinese settlers there are both skilled and manual workers, settling down both in the 
countryside and in the cities. 
In the case of Latin America and the Caribbean, bilateral trade with China was not 
significant between 1949 and 1990, although showed an increasing trend from year to year. In 
1980, for example, bilateral trade volume was only 1.33 billion USD (Lehoczki, 2008, p. 181). 
Trade growth started in the 90s: between 1990 and 2003 Latin American exports to China 
grew by more than 21 percent, while imports from China grew by an average of 30 percent 
annually during the same period. Just like the case of Africa, the really significant growth 
began after the turn of the millennium: between 2000 and 2010, China’s trade with Latin 
America and the Caribbean grew faster than its trade with any other region, between 2005 and 
2010, the growth of China's exports and imports to this region was twice as big as its trade 
with the rest of the world. 
 
Figure 3. 
 
 Source: China Statistical Database and MOFCOM 
 
In real terms, this means that from 6,11 billion USD in 1995 bilateral trade volume 
increased to almost 50 billion by 2005 (Lehoczki, 2008, p. 181), but three years later, in 2008, 
it was 120 billion USD already (Sutter, 2010, p. 328), and in 2011 rose to 241.5 billion, 
according to the data of Chinese Statistical Office (see Figure 3.). Some countries in the 
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region have already signed a free trade agreement with China: firstly, Chile in 2006, then Peru 
in 2010 and Costa Rica in 2011
11
. 
According to the statistics of Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (ECLAC), the region's share of China's total export and import is 6 percent, which 
is still relatively small, but the region’s importance is growing. At the same time, the United 
States and the European Union is gradually losing their shares: according to ECLAC 
estimates, within a few years China may change places with the European Union and 
occupies the second position among the region's main trading partners.  
China's main trading partners in the region are Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Uruguay, 
these countries accounted for nearly 55 percent of trade between China and the region. China 
has become a major partner for most of the countries in the region within a relatively short 
period of time: in the case of export, China is among the five main destinations for Argentina, 
Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Peru and Uruguay, while as a source of import China is 
in the top five in all of the 17 countries – with the exception of Honduras – analysed by 
ECLAC (ECLAC, 2010). 
As in most cases, there is a deficit in their trade relations too, although its direction is 
changing from time to time: initially China had surplus, then the Latin American exports 
increased to a greater extent from the mid-2000s but in the last two years, the Chinese export 
gained the upper hand – although slightly – again. Spatial distribution of the current deficit is 
not balanced, a large part of it arise in the trade between China and Central America or 
Mexico, while trade between China and South American States has been typically in balance 
over the past decade, based on ECLAC data. This deficit could be eliminated by the 
transformation of Central American and Mexican trade strategies, although as the European 
and U.S. experiences indicate, this is not necessarily a guarantee for success. 
The range of products exported by China to the countries of the region is less 
diversified compared to other commercial relations of Latin America. Nearly 60 percent of its 
exports to China are raw materials, followed by natural resource-based processed products, 
processed mineral products and agricultural products. The structure of Chinese export is quite 
similar to its other relations: they typically export manufactured products and finished 
products to Latin America.  
                                                 
11
 A year after the free trade agreement with Chile entry into force, bilateral trade volume showed a 100 percent 
increase, which has led to the extension of the agreement, the other two countries benefited substantially from 
the agreement as well. 
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After the crisis of 2008, fearing of their own industries, many Latin American 
countries have initiated anti-dumping procedures against China, where the main items were 
iron and steel products, textiles, footwear, household appliances and tires. Most of these 
procedures were initiated by Argentina and Brazil, even though these countries were among 
the first who granted market economy status to China. Finally, the number of cases began to 
decline significantly in 2010. 
From the 90s, in parallel with the growth of trade relations, Chinese investment to 
Latin America started to increase as well. Based on ECLAC estimates, by the end of 2009, 17 
percent of China's non-financial FDI arrived to Latin American and the Caribbean region, 
however, a considerable part of these investments arrived to the region’s two major financial 
centres, the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands. In 2010, Chinese multinational 
companies invested more than 15 billion USD in the region, making China the third largest 
foreign investor of Latin American and the Caribbean after the United States and the 
Netherlands. In 2011, the amount of Chinese investment was over 20 billion USD, which – 
according to Chinese statistics
12
 – made this region the second best destination for Chinese 
FDI. 
If the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands are omitted from the calculation 
because of their obvious redistributive role, the increase of Chinese FDI is still significant: the 
volume of Chinese FDI to this region grew by 1500 percent between 2003 and 2009, from 
less than 22 million USD in 2003 to nearly 350 million in 2009. 
In addition to the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands, main destinations of 
Chinese investment are Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela and Peru, but smaller economies such as 
Ecuador or Guyana also receive significant amounts of Chinese FDI. In Central America and 
Mexico the role of the Chinese capital is negligible. 
 
3.2. China’s hunger for energy 
In addition to China’s growing demand for raw materials, its hunger for energy 
resources is another key aspects of China’s relation to the developing countries, therefore this 
aspect significantly determines China’s trade and investment relations to these regions. Since 
China needs these resources for its further development, complex strategies have been 
developed to ensure that the necessary resources will be available continuously. An important 
security aspect of these strategies is that diversification plays an important role in ensuring 
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 The statistics also quoted by China Daily at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2012-
06/30/content_15538393.htm  
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energy resources, both in the case of imports and investments. China cannot afford to depend 
on just one or two markets, it must obtain these resources through more channels. 
 Regarding China’s demand for energy and its energy sector, both have changed a lot 
over the past decades due to the strong economic growth. Although coal is still considered 
one of the most important energy sources of China, which accounts for two-thirds of the 
country's total energy consumption, the role of oil continues to increase and the Chinese 
government devote a growing importance to natural gas as well as renewables. Role and share 
of oil, gas, water and nuclear energy will definitely rise in the coming period, however, coal 
will certainly remain China's main energy source for a long time. 
 In terms of crude oil, which is its second main source of energy, China used to be self-
sufficient till 1993, and even exported it in the 80s. As a result of the economic growth and 
comprehensive developments, China needed so much oil that it started to import it to such an 
extent that it became the world's second largest energy consumer after the United States. 
Today, China imports 40 percent of its energy needs and this figure is estimated to increase 
by up to 85 percent by 2030 (Peyrouse, 2007). According to U.S. government estimates, 
China's oil demand will double by 2020, reaching 11 million barrels per day, while natural 
gas demand will grow three-fold over the same period and reach nearly 3.6 billion cubic 
meters a year (Shuja, 2006).  
 From 1997, to meet its growing energy needs, Beijing has used an offensive strategy, 
whose main area was the acquisition of foreign oil fields with various additional investments. 
Main state actors in this area are the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and its 
subsidiaries: the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), the National Oil and 
Gas Exploration and Development Corporation and the China National Petrochemical 
Corporation (Sinopec), which invests in refineries.  
This strategy was confirmed later by the war in Iraq, as Beijing evaluated it as a new 
threat to its energy security. The main elements of the strategy are the followings: 
1. China continues to develop domestic oil and gas production. The country 
currently has oil reserves mainly in the northern and western parts of the country 
(far from the eastern and southern venues of utilization), however, these resources 
are about to run out, or their operations require unreasonable costs, therefore 
China is developing new oil fields, especially in Tibet and Xinjiang, while also 
experimenting with drilling at the South China Sea. 
2. In addition to the diversification of import, the acquisition of foreign oil fields is 
the most appropriate way to ensure permanent availability of energy resources. 
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Already between 1997 and 1998, right after the announcement of this strategy, 
China spent nearly 8 billion USD to purchase oil fields in Africa, Latin America 
and Central Asia (mainly in Sudan, Venezuela and Kazakhstan) (Kielmas, 2005), 
with the primary goal to decrease dependency on the Middle East (Saudi Arabia, 
Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Yemen) import. 
3. Transport by oil tankers can be dangerous too, depending on the current 
geopolitical situation. China is right to be afraid of a possible U.S. energy 
blockade, since the Malacca Strait, which is the main connecting channel between 
the Indian and Pacific Ocean is controlled by the United States. 60 percent of 
China's energy imports passes through here (Ziegler, 2006). The Chinese strategy 
is therefore to replace tankers for continental oil and natural gas pipelines
13
.  
In case of China’s energy relations with the developing world, the role of the Asia-
Pacific region is the less significant. Although the ASEAN countries have oil and gas 
resources, various minerals as well as hydroelectric resources, so this aspect is also present in 
the relations between these countries and China. As mentioned earlier, mineral fuels and oil 
products are among the export products of ASEAN countries to China, but in fact the South 
East Asian and especially the East Asian countries are net oil and natural gas importers, so 
their resources are often not even cover their own needs. 
 The disputed islands in South China Sea are close to major petroleum deposits, 
however their exploitation is not yet possible with the existing expertise and technology, 
moreover, some countries of the region also laid claims to these territories, most of them are 
also energy importers. However, China is looking straight ahead and still considers it possible 
to access these resources later. Besides the historical factors that are often expressed in 
connection with the South China Sea disputes, this is one of the main reasons why China will 
not give up these areas, even if it heightens tension with its important partners. 
Compared to the Asia-Pacific, in the case of Central Asia there are more opportunities 
and less tension. China's energy hunger was undoubtedly the most important reason for 
strengthening relations with Central Asia in recent decades. The countries of this region are 
typically looking for new export opportunities for their hydrocarbon resources, as they want 
to reduce their dependence on Russia. Although the production costs are currently higher 
compared to the Middle East, but for two reasons it is more preferable for the Chinese: for 
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 For example, to this end, China signed several deals with Russian energy companies on production and 
pipeline projects in 2013 that will direct exports away from Europe to Asia.  
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them, this relationship is based on political alliance and solid consensus and they considers it 
as a more reliable long-term investment. 
The construction of oil and gas pipelines connecting Central Asia to China is a 
complex issue both financially and technically: the geographical distance is huge (between 
3000 and 10000 km), the costs of construction amount to billions of dollars, and China 
arrived several years after the big international companies, by when they have booked the 
most promising areas
14
. Despite this late arrival, China may still be a major player in the 
region's oil and gas extraction, to achieve this it acquires all promising second-class (older or 
hard-to-get) fields, and it also appears in countries, such as Uzbekistan, considered risky by 
international companies (Fehér-Szunomár, 2009 pp. 248-249).  
The relation with the Middle East is still important for China in terms of its energy 
needs. Before 1994, less than 40 percent of China’s oil imports came from this area, but this 
share has exceeded 50 per cent from 1996. While in the case of small oil-producing countries 
Chinese oil import increased or declined occasionally in recent years, in the case of the large 
producers such as Iran or Saudi Arabia, it has increased exponentially. For example, Iran 
accounted for only 1 percent of China's imports in 1994, which increased to 15 percent by 
2002 (Jin, 2005, p. 3), and reached 22 percent in 2011 (Baru, 2012). In recent years, China 
has built intensive business and strategic ties with the Gulf area, it become the major Asian 
partner of this region, and also the largest oil importer of Cooperation Council for the Arab 
States of the Gulf (GCC)
15
 ahead of the United States (Baru, 2012).  
Baru quotes a Chinese source of high standing, who said that despite China has been 
consistently investing in Central Asian and Russian pipelines or buy African oil stocks, the 
primary option for China is still the Gulf because of the abundance of resources, the 
geographical position and good transport connections
16
. Although China's strategy in recent 
times aims the diversification of sources, it is a fact that while the United States and Europe 
are trying to reduce their dependence to this region, China, or even India remains substantially 
dependent on the Gulf countries in terms of energy (Baru, 2012). However, the region's share 
declined slightly lately as China opened to other areas, such as Africa. 
Due to the strengthening African relations from the early nineties, China diversified its 
oil import and was also able to reduce its dependence from Indonesia, Yemen and Oman. The 
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 Such as the Kashagan and Tengiz oil fileds. 
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 GCC members are Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Oman and Saudi Arabia. 
16
 Another proof of China’ future plans about the Middle East oil is that it is the largest investor in Pakistan’s 
deep-water port at Gwadar, which could reduce the distance of ship travelling from 16000 kilometres to 2,500 
kilometres in the future. 
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African countries are attractive to Chinese oil companies for many reasons: Angola, Algeria, 
Libya, Nigeria and Sudan are the most significant oil and gas producers in the region, all of 
them have several significant and unexplored reserves, in addition, they offer an alternative to 
the Gulf countries, for example, because they are much more interested in Chinese financial 
and technical cooperation in the field of exploration and extraction. If Western companies just 
turn their backs on those countries for political reasons, China is right there to offer a helping 
hand. The above-mentioned Chinese oil companies are providing low-interest loans for 
extraction, which is often related to the involvement of Chinese goods and services (Asche-
Schüller, 2008, p. 23). 
In 1992, China imported oil from different parts of the world for a total of 1.72 billion 
USD, Africa's share in it was only 77 million. In 2007, the total value of China’s oil imports 
was nearly 80 billion USD, Africa's share has already reached 25.85 billion in it by then. 
Although the amount has increased further since then, Africa’s share in China’s oil import 
typically ranges between 30-32 percent, making Africa the most important players in China's 
oil import. At the same time, China’s share in the African crude oil export was not significant 
in the early 2000s compared to the United States or the European Union, in fact, it was barely 
exceeded 10 percent in 2009, which is approximately the same as the share of France, Canada 
or Brazil (Liang, 2011). However, China’s share continues to grow and Africa’s role is of 
prime importance in terms of China's oil security. 
Finally, the energy relation between China and Latin America is also necessary to 
mention, as the main destination of Chinese FDI in this region is natural resources, including 
energy resources. Currently, Latin America has 13.5 percent of the world's oil reserves, while 
only 6 percent of the total extraction (Lehoczki, 2008, p. 187). One of the main problems of 
the region’s energy sector is the lack of capital (required for exploration and extraction), in 
which, however, China abounds. Therefore, both sides can benefit from the cooperation, 
while Chinese presence could also have a positive impact on the Latin American energy 
sector, making it more competitive in negotiations with foreign energy companies. Based on 
ECLAC data, 90 percent of Chinese investment in Latin America’s natural resources flows 
especially to oil and gas sector, and (to a lesser extent) mining. In 2010, for example, China 
spent 13.3 billion USD in oil and gas transactions in Ecuador, Venezuela and Argentina. 
Sinopec, CNOOC and Sinochem also made some important acquisitions in Brazil and 
Argentina (ECLAC, 2011). 
Although Latin America has a very small share of China's oil imports currently (in 
2003, it accounted for only one percent of China's total oil imports, which increased to 3 by 
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2005), but this share is also increasing, while the role of the region is also important in terms 
of the Chinese energy security (Lehoczki, 2008, p. 187). 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
The concept of ‘harmonious world’ is in fact China’s first official idea of the international 
order, and vision about what the world – and China within that – should be like. The Chinese 
have recognized that their stability, growth and development can have a positive impact on 
the world and vice versa, as the cooperation with other regions and countries is essential for 
the development of China, while Chinese growth is also indispensable for global prosperity. 
Just as President Hu Jintao stated at the 17
th
 National Congress of the Chinese Communist 
Party: “China cannot develop in isolation from the rest of the world, nor can the world enjoy 
stability and prosperity without China”17. 
The multipolar worldview is sympathetic to China because it can seek after a leading 
position without taking the tasks and responsibilities of a unipolar or a bipolar power. China 
builds its own sphere of influence, where it could decide – based on its own economic and 
political interests – where and to what extent it should cooperate with other regions and 
countries. In a multipolar world, the United States and the European Union can be poles, just 
like the BRIC countries. Next to these main poles of power, the countries of the developing 
world also represent an increasingly important role in Chinese foreign policy. Beijing has 
been building its bilateral relations in this field for decades, although the period of the last ten 
to fifteen years is more decisive. China builds its own sphere of influence in the developing 
world, but it constantly pays attention to make this cooperation mutually beneficial for all of 
the parties involved in it, however, mutually does not always mean equally… 
According to the main findings of this study, instead of being a new colonialist, China 
is becoming the mouthpiece, opinion leader, an increasingly important investor and trade 
partner of the developing world. China offers a friendly partnership and win-win cooperation 
to the developing countries and often stresses that it wants to treat them as equal partners. 
Although this is not always the reality, China tries to ensure the benefits for both sides and 
create lasting values indeed. The ‘Chinese package’ contains the variety of concession 
contracts, the development of local infrastructure as well as preferential loans, agreements on 
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 Quote from President Hu Jintao’s speech at the 17th Party Congress, 2007. Source: China Daily, 25 October, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-10/25/content_6204667.htm (accessed 7 June 2012) 
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debt remission, aids and preferential conditions to improve the developing country’s export 
potential: 
- Regarding the East and Southeast Asian relations, the strategic importance of 
the region for China is undisputable and in some cases, it is also easier for 
China to cooperate, thanks to their common – historical and/or geographical – 
roots. The development of a close relationship with these countries was 
important from the early stages of the Chinese foreign policy, even in the 
isolationist era.  
- For a long time Central Asia seemed to be a place for US-Russian competition, 
but today it is much more likely that the Chinese influence will be 
strengthened in this region while pushing the other two powers into the 
background. This process also raises some geopolitical questions, since today 
the states of Central Asia can have a major key role in deciding issues such as 
energy policy. 
- On the one hand, for the other developing countries, especially for African and 
Latin American states, China offers a great opportunity to break out from 
poverty and isolation and to reduce their foreign political and economical 
dependence on Europe and North America. On the other hand, these countries 
might prefer to listen to a power, which is successfully developing for decades 
with a development path different from that in the West, it is still a developing 
country just like them, and has no political requirements.  
It is true that more and more – especially developing – countries expect China to 
represent heir interests, while other – mostly the developed – countries expect China to use its 
increased influence and power to stabilize the current world order, but as a matter of fact, this 
new kind of responsibility is also in China’s own interest: as the Chinese economy is growing 
and expanding globally, the Chinese interests are spreading all over the world as well, which 
means that China is becoming increasingly interested in the stability and prosperity of these 
regions. 
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